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War and National Renewal: Civil
Religion and Blood Sacrifice in
American Culture
Agnieszka Soltysik Monnet
1 Wars are often associated with a rhetoric of renewal or “new beginnings.” Putting
aside for a moment the possibility that this is only rhetoric, I would like to examine the
conditions which allow war – sometimes – to function as an occasion for a new purchase
on a shared sense of  national  identity and common purpose.  One critical  frame that
brings  such  a  proposition  into  focus  is  the  sociology  of  religion  and  group  identity
founded by Emile Durkheim and developed in America since the 1960s in terms of the
notion  of  civil  religion.  Specifically,  I  will  consider  a  recent  book  which  combines
Durkheim’s  insights  with Réné Girard’s  claims about  the social  function of  ritualized
sacrifice into a troubling argument about modern national cohesion as dependent on
blood sacrifice. Even if many modern nation states define themselves as quintessentially
secular  and legal  entities,  inspiring  healthy  patriotism rather  than overly  emotional
nationalism, they share with explicitly descent-based nationalisms a substratum of more
“mystical” ideals and rituals.1 The most important, complex, and seemingly irrational of
these  is  self-sacrifice  for  the  common  good  or  the  group.  This  willingness,  closely
associated  with  military  valor  and  patriotic  heroism,  is  in  fact  essential  to  the
cohesiveness and endurance of any group, argue Carolyn Marvin and David Ingle in their
book, Blood Sacrifice and the Nation. Without it, a nation will not be able to defend itself and
will not even want to. A nation that cannot inspire its members to lay down their life for
it will inevitably fragment into clashing groups and lose its sovereignty.
2 Since the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the beginning of the age of
the modern nation-state, patriotic sacrifice has been regarded as the noblest and most
civilized gesture a man can perform for his country. Yet modern scholars of nationalism
and national identity view self-sacrifice uneasily. While recognizing its central place in
definitions  of  viable  nations  (those  that  produce  a  lasting  sense  of  coherence  and
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continuity in their populations), historians and scholars of national identity are at pains
to account for the intensity of attachment that would induce individuals to die for their
nation. Moreover, the specter of Japanese suicide pilots and Islamic airplane hijackers,
whose deaths may be understood as heroic sacrifices in their own cultural contexts but as
terrorism in ours, complicates the work of distinguishing “appropriate” martyrdom from
religious fanaticism. If, as Tom Nairn has suggested, the nation is “the modern Janus,” no
other aspect of national experience is more double-faced than patriotic self-sacrifice.2
This essay will attempt to unpack some of the paradoxes raised by the notion of sacrifice
in the context of US military history as well as the media treatment of the September 11
attacks, with a special focus on the sacred status of the flag and the ambivalent position
of the soldier (and other uniformed servicemen such as police and firefighters). My final
objective is to probe the theory of national renewal based on blood sacrifice advanced by
Carolyn Marvin and David Ingle by testing its explanatory power for two images that have
become iconic as representations of military service and sacrifice: Rosenthal’s photo of
the flag-planting at Iwo Jima and Thomas Franklin’s photo of Ground Zero. 
3 Any discussion of the relationship between war and national renewal should begin
with  the  fact  that  most  nations  conceptualize  and narrate  their  origins  in  terms  of
foundational wars. In France, this was the Revolution of 1789, in Germany, the conclusion
of the Franco-Prussian War in 1871, and for many postcolonial nations, such as the United
States, their war of independence. Many nations also structure their national histories
around the subsequent wars that they waged with other nations or internally. These are
the events that organize national history and they are sometimes (but far from always)
associated with a  regeneration of  national  cohesion and patriotic  attachment.  In the
United States, the Civil War and the Second World War are widely regarded as the two
most important military conflicts in terms of reorganizing national identity and renewing
a sense of national purpose. World War I also had an important impact on the country,
but its place in national memory is more controversial and complex due to the lack of
clarity about its objectives in the minds of American citizens and soldiers alike. The many
other wars conducted by the United States, e.g. the War of 1812, the Mexican-American
War, the Indian Wars, the Spanish-American War, the Korean, Vietnam, and Persian Gulf
Wars, may have generated brief moments of patriotic effervescence, gained territory and
political  and  economic  objectives,  and  produced  important  collective  memories  and
rituals, but none of them can be said to have reset the clock of nation-time and boosted
an enduring sense of national collective purpose in any way remotely like the Civil War
and World War II.3 
4 If America was “born” in the Revolutionary War, it is justifiable to say that it was
“reborn” in the Civil War. Robert Penn Warren has claimed that the “The Civil War is, for
the American imagination, the great single event of our history.”4 Before the Civil War,
Warren contends,  the United States “had no history in the deepest and most inward
sense.”  John  Neff  has  recently  proposed  that  the  Civil  War  produced  two  separate
national ideologies which could each be called a civil religion: the Lost Cause of the South,
and the “Cause Victorious” of the North.5 Yet, as most historians would agree, by the time
the U.S. had entered into World War I, the Southern myth of its martyrdom had begun to
converge with Northern narratives to produce a revisionist history that conceived of the
Civil War as a shared experience of national suffering. This was the argument made by
Woodrow Wilson’s A History of the American People (1902) and was popularized by D.W.
Griffith’s film A Birth of a Nation (1914), which drew on Wilson’s work for its historical
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claims. It was on this basis that Warren could claim that the Civil War gave the United
States a history that it had not had before: as the foundation of a newly reconceived
nation. Most historians would agree that American national self-understanding changed
significantly during the Civil War. One concrete example of this transformation is the
shift in usage from the plural to the singular in relation to the United States, as in “The
United States is a republic” as opposed to “The United States are a republic.” This shift is
generally dated to around 1861,  which is to say,  the beginning of the Civil  War,  and
helped American conceptualize the entity or cause they were fighting for (on the Union
side, that is).6 Another example of how the Civil War helped create a sense of common
national identity is the way in which it occasioned the founding of a national military
cemetery system. Up until the Civil War, the bodies of slain American soldiers had not
been retrieved systematically from battlefields nor been the objects of special reverence.
It was in 1862 that, for the first time, the U.S. government decided to set aside, by Act of
Congress, special cemeteries to bury the bodies of those who gave their lives in defense of
the Republic, and an entire network of sacred national sites was thereby created.7 
5 The single most famous formulation of the way in which war is linked to a discourse of
national renewal is Abraham Lincoln’s address at the dedication of one of the first of
these  national  military  cemeteries:  the  Soldier’s  National  Cemetery  at  Gettysburg,
Pennsylvania,  in  1863,  exactly  midway  through  the  Civil  War.  Lincoln’s  Gettysburg
Address is a powerful mixture of political and religious rhetoric that should serve as a
point of departure for any analysis of the notion of American civil religion. Although this
concept no longer inspires the same intensity of debate as it did in the decade following
Robert  Bellah’s  influential  essay  on  the  subject  in  1967,  it  remains  a  compelling
framework through which to understand the emotional and quasi-mystical dimensions of
American politics.8 Civil religion has been defined in a variety of ways, but I use it to refer
to the way in which national institutions, rituals and ideologies function like a religion:
dividing the world into sacred and profane spheres, providing constituents with a sense
of supra-individual transcendence and collective continuity, and offering an emotionally
satisfying frame for coping with death. If  national civil  religion resembles traditional
religions in these three aspects, the modern nation has wrested from religion a fourth
aspect that it now monopolizes completely: the power to kill non-members for the sake of
its self-preservation and to ask members to die in its name. Currently, only the nation-
state legitimately holds this right, which is why the nation can be said to have replaced
religion in the social organization of death.
6 Lincoln’s speech at Gettysburg offers a revealing blueprint of how religious notions
structure American political ideology. The word “dedicated” is used seven times in this
speech of 267 words. The first use is completely neutral, in the sense of “committed to” or
“defined by”: “Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent
a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are
created equal.” However, in the next lines, Lincoln begins to rework the meaning of this
word, pushing it steadily into a religious frame. For example, the third appearance of the
term is synonymous to “consecrate” or set aside as sacred, without actually saying so
explicitly: “We have come to dedicate a portion of that field, as a final resting place for
those who here gave their lives that that nation might live.” 
7 To speak of “dedicating” a piece of land for burial purposes, while not in itself overtly
religious, shifts the register of the term in a more religious direction by referring to an
activity, that of burial, which had traditionally been a function performed by the church
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and not the state. Building upon this sense of the word, Lincoln repeats it once more in
the next line, this time as an exact synonym of “consecrate,” and reinforces this meaning
by the even more explicitly religious verb “to hallow.” 
8 In other words, “dedication” has at least two different meanings in the Gettysburg
Address: that of committing one’s self to a course of action or program, and a setting
aside for religious or special purposes. When Lincoln says in the third paragraph that “we
can not dedicate” this ground, he performs a subtle but significant confusion between the
two senses. By arguing that the battle itself has “consecrated” the land, Lincoln shifts
from the neutral to the religious sense of the word and moreover implies that the battle
itself is somehow sacred. Sociologically, in the light of Durkheim’s theory, which locates
the sacred in the experience of the collective, this makes sense, i.e. the battle is sacred
because it is about the fate of the nation. 
9 The concepts invoked here, i.e. dedication, consecration, and devotion, are used in
ways that need to be understood not only for their rhetorical value but for their ritual
and performative function in the context of the official event at which they are uttered:
the dedication of one of the very first war cemeteries. Lincoln was not only dedicating
this one cemetery, he was defining the meaning and purpose of the war cemetery as a
national institution. In doing so, he articulated one of the most enigmatic paradoxes of
national identity: namely, that it is strengthened by the lives that are lost in its name. The
“devotion” inspired in the survivors by the sacrifice of the dead produces a “new birth of
freedom,” a phrase that refigures the deaths of the soldiers into an image of birth linked
to national identity through the word “freedom” (a term which vaguely but unmistakably
signifies “America”). In other words, death, figured and understood as willing sacrifice,
invests  the  nation  with  a  sense  of  purpose,  collective  feeling,  and  renewed  unity.
Although Lincoln’s speech invokes this transformative magic by which death becomes a
“new birth,” it does not explain how it works.9 After all, the many deaths at Gettysburg
could seem to dilute the cohesion of the Union and be figured as a tragedy to be regretted
rather than an occasion for regeneration. The logic by which death re-energizes national
solidarity and cohesion can best be understood through the disciplines of sociology and
anthropology and will be examined in a moment. 
10 Since the Civil War, only World War II has come close to playing a comparable role of
renewing a sense of sacred feeling and common purpose.10 In both cases, I am referring to
a sense of collective unity that is articulated most clearly after the fact, in the national
narrative and memory that finally takes stock of the event, and do not wish to eclipse the
complexity of cultural forces that were in play during the actual events. During the Civil
War, there were riots by draft resisters, and many Americans on both sides of the conflict
felt  that  the  price  to  pay  for  Union  and  Emancipation  was  far  too  high.  American
participation in the Second World War also had its opponents and critics, even after the
attack on Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, World War II has been dubbed “The Good War” in
common parlance because of its seeming moral clarity. The dropping of the atomic bomb
and the firebombing of German cities may have tainted the moral high-ground claimed
by the Allies for some observers, but the Second World War has nevertheless entered
American national memory as the most important episode of collective effort and public
solidarity in the twentieth century. Former New York Governor Mario Cuomo recalls the
Second World War as the “last time that this country believed anything profoundly, any
great single cause”:
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We are good, they are bad. Let’s all get together we said, and
we creamed them. We started from way behind. We found strength
in this common commitment, this commonality, community, family.
The idea of coming together was best served in my lifetime in the
Second World War.11
11 Besides  evoking  a  Manichean  moral  simplicity  commonly  associated  with  WWII,
Cuomo’s description of the war is most revealing in its curious last phrase: the idea of
coming together being “best served” by the Second World War. “Coming together” is
necessary for any group that wants to endure, and Cuomo’s slightly awkward phrasing
inadvertently  suggests  that  war  is  a  means  of  fulfilling  this  need.  The  currently
recognized effectiveness of the Second World War in performing this function is clear
from  Cuomo’s  emphatically  redundant  description  of  the  unparalleled  solidarity  it
created: “this common commitment, this commonality, community, family.” As if this
series of cognates of “common” were not enough, Cuomo follows up with the phrase
“coming  together,”  emphasizing  that  the  unity  he  describes  does  did  not emerge
automatically from a natural solidarity but is more accurately described as a defensive
reaction to an outside threat, so therefore necessarily ephemeral. Rapturous accounts of
World War II unity are inevitably either eulogies or jeremiads, but their shared trait is a
regret that the sense of cohesion did not last longer. 
12 Nonetheless, even if the glow of World War II as a collective experience faded in the
decades that followed, and was overshadowed by the divisive war in Vietnam and other
crises of political authority, it can be said that World War II still remains for the time
being  the  most  effective  functional  paradigm for  interpreting  large-scale  death  in  a
national narrative. This became especially clear during the Sept. 11 attacks in New York.
Although the initial comparison that many commentators made was with Pearl Harbor,
the image that dominated the media in the weeks after the attacks (and which has since
been immortalized as a postage stamp), Thomas Franklin’s photo of firefighters raising a
flag, drew comparisons with a very different World War II event: the planting of the flag
on  Iwo  Jima.  If  the  comparison  with  Pearl  Harbor  needs  no  explanation  (though  it
certainly  requires  qualification),  the  logic  of  mapping  Joseph  Rosenthal’s  famous
photograph onto the rubble of the Twin Towers deserves careful unpacking. Why should
that  image  of  territory-marking  in  the  Pacific  be  a  framework  for  mediating  and
understanding  the  attack  on  New  York?  What  exactly  is  the  connection,  besides  the
compositional  similarity  of  the  photos?  One  obvious  answer  is  the  “rising  from the
rubble” metaphor suggested by the devastated landscape of both images. Yet this answer
is not entirely satisfying since the devastated landscape on Iwo Jima is foreign land and
the flag-raisers are the authors rather than victims of an attack. In other words, the
rubble is not theirs to rise from.
13 I would suggest that Iwo Jima was invoked in the wake of 9/11 for another reason: its
depiction of American sacrifice as a ritual of national regeneration. Although the photo is
generally understood to signify victory, it is also understood to evoke the high cost of
that  victory.  The fact  that  Iwo Jima was one of  the bloodiest  landings of  the Pacific
campaign is indissociably linked to the cultural status of the photo. Among the various
meanings attributable to the Rosenthal photo, then, mass death is one. In fact, as Clint
Eastwood’s 2006 film, Flags of Our Fathers, reminded us, three of the six soldiers in the
Rosenthal photo died in the days following the picture-taking (the photo was taken on
the third day of a month-long battle). However, instead of depicting corpses or wounded
men, as many war photos do, the photo depicts in the most vivid possible terms the
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loyalty of American troops to the American flag and therefore to America (the photo
depicts  this  regardless  of  the  question  of  whether  the  soldiers  actually  felt  such
patriotism or had simply been ordered to raise the flag). The tacit message behind this
deliberately choreographed show of patriotism is that these young men are willingly
fighting and dying for America.12 In Blood Sacrifice and the Nation, Marvin and Ingle argue
that only willing self-sacrifice can function successfully to create a sense of  national
renewal. Soldiers and other uniformed servicemen, by definition, are understood to be
willing to lay down their lives for the nation or for others. In other words, the photo of
the flag-raising on Iwo Jima became such a powerful and popular icon of military service
because it  shows soldiers demonstrating their loyalty to the flag,  and thereby to the
nation it represents, in a clear and unambiguous tableau, against an invisible backdrop of
massive fatality. The fact that the deaths at Iwo Jima can therefore be considered willing
sacrifices gives them great ritual power in terms of generating the “heightened devotion”
invoked by Lincoln at Gettysburg. 
14 Accordingly,  it  could be argued that the American media invoked Iwo Jima as an
interpretive schema to make sense of the Sept. 11 attacks in order to frame them in the
regenerative terms of national sacrifice. Yet, since most of the 2976 people who died in
those two buildings were not willing sacrifices, unlike soldiers in battle, they did not fit
well  in this  narrative.  Marvin and Ingle’s  insistence that  group members must  seem
willing to die for the group in order for their  deaths to successfully generate group
cohesion can help  explain  the  way  firefighters  and other  uniformed public  servants
became the almost  obsessive focus of  the national  media in the weeks following the
attacks. It is particularly striking how much emphasis was placed on the volunteer aspect
of their commitment to their work. The thirst for narratives of self-sacrifice was so strong
that one woman, Tania Head, became nationally famous for her fraudulent account of
being saved by a man who then went back into one of the towers and died. The revealing
thing about this hoax is that the perpetrator did not invent a story of her own miraculous
escape or heroism but a story of someone else’s heroic death.13 She intuitively sensed that
self-sacrifice  generates  far  more  emotional  and  symbolic  currency  than  survival,  no
matter how lucky. 
15 If the immediate reaction of the media was to read the Sept. 11 attacks in terms of
World War II frames of reference, President Barack Obama gestured rhetorically back to
Gettysburg in his speech commemorating the attacks in 2009. Calling on the American
public to make Sept. 11 serve as an occasion for national renewal, Obama said: “On a day
when others sought to sap our confidence, let us renew our common purpose, let us
remember how we came together as one nation, as one people, as Americans united.”
Echoing  Cuomo’s  description of  World  War  II,  Obama invokes  the  ideals  of  “coming
together,” a “common purpose,” “one nation” and “one people.” Speaking of the death of
nearly 3000 Americans as an occasion for unity, Obama invokes the familiar rhetoric of
national renewal based on mass death. 
16 In order better to understand how a compelling sense of national unity and renewal
can be generated by a massacre like the Sept. 11 attacks, we need to look into sociology
and specifically the concept of civil religion, which is concerned with the religious or
emotional aspects of nationalism. This is a field that historians shy away from because it
does  not  lend itself  to  the same kind of  empirical  analysis  as  political  speeches  and
historical events – yet it exerts a fascination because it represents the unexamined core
of patriotism as attachment or strong feeling that is defined precisely by a willingness to
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die for one’s country. Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1983), one of the most
influential recent works on national identity, begins and ends with attempts to reflect on
this question and yet consistently shies away from engaging with it head on. 
In  the  preceding  chapters  I  have  tried  to  delineate  the
processes  by  which  the  nation  came  to  be  imagined...  But  it  is
doubtful  whether  either  social  change  or  transformed
consciousness,  in  themselves,  do  much to  explain  the  attachment 
that  people  feel  for  the  inventions  of  their  imaginations--or,  to
return  to  a  question  raised  at  the  beginning  of  this  text--  why
people are ready to die for these inventions.14 
17 As Anderson reminds his readers in this passage, the processes of national identity
formation through media and shared texts do not fully account for the power of these
attachments. Anderson can only express puzzlement at the force of these feelings, which
he consistently equates with and defines by the willingness to sacrifice one’s life for the
idea of the nation. It is this willingness that motivates yet eludes his efforts at analysis, as
they focus on tangible institutions such as museums, newspapers, the census, and other
inventions of written culture. However, the willingness to die for one’s group is not an
invention of the nation state. It has a far longer pedigree and can attach itself to groups
of any size. Nevertheless, the nation-state is currently the only group that can legally
demand its members to sacrifice themselves for its sake.15 
18 The social theorist whose work has been the most pertinent to this issue is Emile
Durkheim, especially in his late work Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1915). Durkheim’s
most  influential  idea  in  this  study is  that  social  belonging  is  essentially  the  root  of
religion, since religious feelings (i.e. awe, submission to a greater power, and a sense of
the sacred and profane) originate in the admiration and fear that the individual feels
before the power of the collectivity. The collectivity has the power to protect or to harm
the individual, and so the individual’s basic attitude towards the group is necessarily an
ambivalent one of attraction/attachment and awe/terror. Durkheim argues that every
human society makes a distinction between the sacred and profane and that this too is
rooted in collective experience. That which is set aside as “sacred” is invested with the
meaning and the power which is  basically that  of  the group,  i.e.  it  is  a  sign for the
collectivity. In the aboriginal tribes that Durkheim used as the basis of his theory, the
sacred takes the form of a totem. Durkheim further argues that the religious practices of
aboriginal tribes are able to reveal the universal traits of all religions and all societies.
Their “primitivism” does not make them qualitatively different from the monotheism of
more”  advanced”  societies,  but  gives  them  rather  the status  of  basic  common
denominator or structural skeleton of all religions. Interestingly, when Durkheim casts
about for a modern equivalent to the totem, he does not cite the Christian cross but the
national  flag.16 Flags  are  our  modern  totems  insofar  as  they  are  the  emblems  that
represent the most widely respected collective units, not tribes in our case but nation-
states. In Durkheimian sociology, then, the modern equivalents of totem and tribe are
flag and country.
19 This  insight  intersects  with  some of  the  work done  in  the  field  of  civil  religion.
However, much of the work on American civil religion in the 1970s that followed Robert
Bellah’s  attempt  to  apply  Durkheimian  notions  to  American  culture  may  have
misconceived the location of the sacred in American society. While scholars debated the
interpenetration  of  religion  and  politics  in  Presidents’  speeches  and  the  supposed
sanctity of  the Constitution in American politics,  the totemic status of the flag as an
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embodied  symbol  of  American  sovereignty  was  largely  overlooked. In  other  words,
historians focused on texts, myths and rhetoric, but ignored the quasi-religious rites and
sacred  objects  that  could  define  American  civil  religion.  Yet,  when we  think  of  the
omnipresence of  the American flag at  official  ceremonies,  government offices,  public
buildings,  schools  and  sports  events,  as  well  as  the  elaborate  rules  that  govern  its
fabrication, handling and disposal, it is impossible to deny that there is an element of the
sacred attached to this object.17 More striking still is the way in which the bodies of dead
soldiers are ritualistically covered by flags, and how flags are given to families in lieu of
the body of the slain soldier. There is a physical continuity between the flag-body and the
soldier-body that Durkheim’s theory of the religious basis of society goes further towards
explaining than any official account of why flags are given to soldiers’ families. Finally,
not only the intense emotions around flag-burning and flag desecration, but the various
Supreme Court  decisions  concerning the treatment  of  the flag suggest  that  it  is  not
explicitly treated as a religious object only because its status is regarded tacitly as higher
than any other religious symbol.18 This is the point missed by Robert Bellah and other
scholars:  civil  religion  does  not  function  like  other  existing  religions  because  it
transcends  them in  relation to  the  collectivity  as  a  whole.  While  many people  have
abandoned religious beliefs and practice, it is almost impossible to have no nationality.
Even  people  who  have  lost  their  citizenship  one  way  or  another  usually  consider
themselves as “belonging” to some nation in at least a spiritual and cultural sense. The
 main point here is that nationality is generally the first and most important way that
social life on this planet is organized. It commands the most primary emotions and its
leaders, representatives, institutions, and flags require the highest degree of respect.19 
20 While the claim that the American flag is a kind of totem may still be accepted by
most  historians,  Marvin  and  Ingle’s  argument  that  the  nation  is  regenerated  most
effectively by blood sacrifice is more problematic. This is where Réné Girard’s work on
the sacrifice comes in. In Violence and the Sacred (1972), Girard argued that societies are
naturally rife with tensions and conflicts and that they can avoid internal violence only
by directing this aggression towards a common object. This sacrificial scapegoat allows
the group to maintain internal peace by being purged or destroyed. Similarly, Anthony
Marx argues  in  a  recent  study of  national  origins  that  nation-states  did  not  merely
replace the Church, as is commonly accepted, but that they harnessed the exclusionary
tactics and deep passions of religious identity into nationalist politics.20 Linking Christian
martyrology to modern nation-formation,Marvin and Ingle argue that national cohesion
is always constituted on the basis of a collective “victimage” or collective sacrifice.21 In
other words, as nations tend to view their history in terms of foundational moments of
collective sacrifice, such as wars of liberation or other moments of great loss of life, the
intensity of  their  sense of  national  unity and loyalty is  based on a sense of  ongoing
identification with these foundational sacrifices. Here we return to Abraham Lincoln’s
speech at Gettysburg and his hope that the casualties buried in that new war cemetery
would inspire the living to “dedicate” themselves to the cause of American nationhood. 
21 Although nationalistic rhetoric tends to rely heavily on the notion of sacrifice, and we
are  all  familiar  with such phrases  in  political  speeches,  the  idea  that  nations  might
actually  “need”  members  to  be  willing  to  die  for  them can  appear  prima  facie as  a
revolting claim. For many modern subjects, the idea of the nation serves as a powerful
ideal  of  community  and  social  justice.  Civic  nationalism  promises  to  transcend  and
reconcile ethnic, religious, and all other differences by congealing a disparate population
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into a kind of imagined family linked by citizenship and mutual solidarity, and it is in this
utopian guise that the idea of the nation inspires powerful emotions in people across the
political spectrum. Modern political theory defines the role of the nation-state primarily
as one of protection: of nationals from non-nationals, and of citizens from each other.
Therefore, nothing could seem more wrong (even “sacrilegious”) than to propose that the
nation might need members to die for it on a regular basis in order to sustain its sense of
unity. Following Girard’s contention that some rituals require participants to be unaware
of their true meaning and function, Marvin and Ingle argue that the true nature of war as
national sacrificial ritual is the object of a powerful taboo. Although willing sacrifices
create  powerful  group  feeling,  and  political  speeches  such  as  Lincoln’s  Gettysburg
Address tacitly acknowledge this, the group or nation cannot know that it needs members
to die or that it finds ways to send them to die. This fact cannot be explicitly articulated
or understood or the ritual will not work. 
22 The class of willing sacrifices that every viable nation possesses is its military, which
is why soldiers are something like a priestly order: subject to strict selection, training,
rules, and privileges. In the US, the mandatory Soldier’s Oath binds the pledger to protect
the Constitution and obey orders  given by the President  and his  representatives:  "I,
_____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and
allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United
States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God." (Title 10, US Code; Act of 5 May 1960
replacing the wording first adopted in 1789, with amendment effective 5 October 1962).
The  mixture  of  national  and  religious  rhetoric  (“true  faith”,  “So  help  me  God,”
“appointed” officers) is striking for a nation which has made the separation of church and
state a cornerstone of its national creed, but this is to miss the point that the state is itself
a kind of church for all practical purposes. 
23 The  other  striking  thing  about  the  Oath  is  that  it  contains  several  important
omissions.  While  explicitly  naming the Constitution as  the sacred text  of  the United
States, it respects the taboo on naming the real sacred symbol, i.e. the flag. Nevertheless,
while many soldiers would lay down their life to keep an American flag safe, none would
risk injury to protect a copy of the Constitution (or even the original document, for that
matter). The other important omission in the Soldier’s Oath is any reference to killing or
dying, which finally are the two basic tasks that the soldier is authorized to do and which
sets him/her apart from ordinary citizens.22 These all-important implications are couched
in the neutral pledge to obey the President and one’s hierarchical superiors in the Army
who represent his sovereign authority. 
24 The direct and explicit relationship of each soldier to the highest sovereign power in
the  group  articulated  in  the  Soldier’s  Oath,  binding  each  oath-taker  directly  to  the
President, reveals something about why military service occupies such a charged and
often  coveted  place  in  national  experience.  Military  service  confers  on  soldiers  a
privileged relationship to totemic power, the power linked to sovereignty and to the most
sacred  sites,  objects  and  moments  in  national  life.  This  heightened  relationship  to
national belonging is the reason why military service continues to be prized by young
men seeking a rite of passage and a link to something greater than their individual lives.
It is also the reason why women have fought to be accepted into the military and why
African Americans and other ethnic groups have eagerly served in every major war.
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Military service  bears  a  special  relationship to  citizenship and offers  the promise  of
unassailable national credentials.
25 And yet,  soldiers  are  often  objects  of  intense  popular  ambivalence.  The  negative
stereotypes  of  soldiers  as  unthinking  automatons  or  lawless  brutes  are  rooted  in  a
common  perception  that  soldiers  are  qualitatively  different  from  civilians:  they  are
linked to death, either by killing or agreeing to be killed. The unquestioning willingness
to  die,  though  appreciable  in  certain  specific  circumstances,  nevertheless  creates
suspicion that servicemen are uncritical: naive fools in the best of cases, brainwashed
robots in the worst. These negative perceptions are even greater in the case of combat
veterans who have killed as well as risked their lives. The fear and contempt aroused by
Vietnam veterans in the 1970s (before their rehabilitation by official  ceremonies and
shifts in media depictions in the mid 1980s) revealed a discomfort that is latent in the
civilian attitude towards veterans of any war. The official and public respect accorded to
military personnel, all the more ubiquitous and ostentatious since the beginning of the
Iraq War, conceals the fact that there is necessarily a tension between civilians, focused
on their pleasure and profit, and the class of people designated for exposure to death and
injury supposedly to protect them (though, in actual fact, few American wars have been
truly defensive, most advancing economic and imperial interests of limited relevance to
the majority of the population). Thus, the suspicion and distrust is often mutual (with
veterans voicing resentment about having been sent into danger by a population that
doesn’t  seem  to  appreciate  what  soldiers  have  risked  and  lost).  This  mutual
incomprehension came to a head during the Vietnam War but is always present to some
degree. 
26  Military service possesses a truly unusual status in relation to the nation-state: it is
defined by a direct appropriation of the individual in the service of the group. In fact, the
whole point is to de-individualize the individual and to make him as unlike a civilian as
possible. Thus, military training is characterized by strict discipline and the foregoing of
civilian freedoms. The overt rationale for the strictness of military discipline is to make
soldiers  effective  and to  save  lives,  but  an anthropological  view would focus  on the
ritualistic aspect of practices that organize access to legalized murder and self-sacrifice.
Surely one of the most shocking images in Michael Moore’s anti-war film Fahrenheit 9/11
was that of American soldiers in Iraq drunk and stoned and blasting loud rock music as
they careened lawlessly through Iraqi streets shooting from tanks. Moore’s objective in
showing these images was to undermine the credibility of the entire military operation,
since soldiers are supposed to be chaste and sober in order for their access to killing to be
acceptable. By showing the irreverent attitude of American servicemen to their mission,
Moore wished to show that the war itself was corrupt and wrong. In doing so, he was
reviving  a  cultural  narrative  that  had  emerged  during  the  Vietnam  War,  which
characterized the soldiers of that war also as lawless and the war itself as illegal. The
image of the Vietnam soldier as insubordinate and generally lawless is often linked to the
fact that America failed in Vietnam. In fact, all wars since WWII have been failures, as far
as regenerating a collective sense of purpose and national cohesion is concerned: so-
called successful ones, such as the Panama Invasion and Persian Gulf, as ineffective in this
respect as the failures (e.g. Vietnam) and stalemates (e.g. Korea). 
27 The issue of why some wars “work” as national rituals of renewal and some do not is
the subject of a chapter of Marvin and Ingle’s book listing several “conditions” that need
to be met. These conditions are rooted in the ritual aspect of the theory and need to be
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understood  in  anthropological  rather  than  political  terms.  First  of  all,  according  to
Marvin and Ingle, the greater the number of deaths, the greater the effect of national
“coming together” and patriotism. The two most “successful” wars in this regard in the
history of the United States were the Civil War and World War II. In the first, nearly one
in ten able-bodied adult males were killed or injured. In the second, the percentage of
deaths relative to the population was smaller, but 82% of American men between the age
of 20 and 25 were drafted or enlisted, and therefore at risk. 
28 An important corollary of the first condition is that only member deaths count, not
enemy deaths. This would explain why the effects of the First Gulf War, with over 85,000
Iraqi deaths but only 147 American casualties, were so fleeting. Common sense would
suggest that such a resounding victory would translate into a longer lasting sense of
national unity and pride, but scholars all agree that the war faded quickly from popular
memory  and  concern.  Similarly,  the  War  of  1812  (with  2,260  killed),  the  Mexican
American war of 1846-48 (with 1733 deaths) and the Spanish American War of 1898 (with
385) both had little long-term impact on American national self-definition, and even the
Korean and Vietnam Wars (with around 50 and 60 thousand casualties, respectively) did
not touch nearly as much of the population as WWII with its 400,000 deaths (and over a
million combined deaths and wounded). 
29 However, Korea and Vietnam failed to meet other ritual conditions listed by Marvin
and Ingle, including the requirement that the sacrificial victim must be (or appear to be)
willing. The victims, and again, this refers generally to soldiers, must declare themselves
willing to die for the cause, and the group must declare itself willing to sacrifice them. If
the  Soldier’s  Oath  is  the  formal  declaration  of  the  soldier’s  willingness,  an  official
declaration of war is the standard way in which the nation indicates its willingness to
bear the cost of war in soldiers’ lives. The Vietnam War was a failure in all respects, as far
as this condition is concerned, because first of all, the US government never formally
declared war on Vietnam, and secondly U.S. soldiers were increasingly unwilling to die or
even fight in the war as it lost popular support in later years. 
30 Popular support is,  in fact,  another condition for a war to have lasting effects on
national cohesion. The most reliable producer of what Marvin and Ingle call “unanimous
victimage” (i.e. widespread popular consent for member sacrifice) is a credible enemy.23
WWII was an ideal war because it offered enemies that were unambiguously worth killing
and being killed by. The pretext for war must also be seen as coming from the outside, so
as to better conceal the fact that the nation will benefit from its soldiers’ deaths. Again,
Pearl Harbor offered the US an ideal war situation, and Presidents have always made an
effort to create the impression that American military involvement is a reaction to a
belligerent attack rather than a preemptive move (e.g. the fictive Gulf of Tonkin missile
attack in 1964 cited by Johnson as his casus belli in Vietnam).
31 Fourth,  there  must  be  genuine  uncertainty  of  the  outcome,  and  the  greater  the
uncertainty,  the  greater  the  ritual  magic  and  enduring  effects  of  the  outcome.  The
Revolutionary War, the Civil War and WWII all share this feature. There was no certainty
from the  start  that  the  American rebels  would  succeed or  that  the  Southern rebels
wouldn’t. It is also plausible that Normandy has had such an enduring power over the
national imagination because its outcome was so unsure at the time. Similarly, James
Bradley’s account of the Battle of Iwo Jima in Flags of Our Fathers lays special stress on the
way  in  which  the  unexpectedly  high  losses  caused  “a  sickening  anxiety”  about  the
outcome of that operation.24 It took 23 days to secure the island, far more than anyone
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predicted, and success was likely but far from guaranteed. Iwo Jima was the only battle of
the war where the losses of the victors outnumbered the losses of the defenders.
32 Fifth, the outcome must be definite: victory or loss must be clear and borders re-
consecrated in order for time to begin again. The outcome itself is less important than its
clarity. Even a loss can have a tremendously unifying effect on a group (one thinks of the
Alamo or Weimar Germany). In contrast, an ambiguous outcome, such as that in Korea,
cannot create a feeling of national unity. This theory can help explain the memory hole
into which the Korean War disappeared in spite of its 36,574 dead and 103,284 American
wounded.25 
33 Finally, only another ritual can repair a failed ritual. It is interesting in this light to
see how the First Gulf War was offered by President Bush Sr. as an attempt to repair the
failed ritual of the Vietnam War, and how the war in Iraq was understood widely to be
Bush Jr.’s attempt to repair the ultimately failed ritual of the First Gulf War. Since popular
elections are also social rituals whose ritual agency can be compared to that of member
sacrifice, it is important to see how Clinton’s election in 1992, on his promise of a “new
covenant” with America, and more recently, Obama’s election in 2008, were understood
by many Americans as  rituals  that  could heal  the divisions that  have been plaguing
America since the failure of the Vietnam War.26 Obama’s failure to bridge the gap between
the left and right in the US (and what political figure could?) has shown how quickly such
hopes can evaporate. 
34 In the past six decades, the only event that came even close to generating the kind of
national feeling Mario Cuomo describes having about WWII was the Sept. 11 attack. Yet
the deaths at the Twin Towers ultimately did not have the cohesive effect of the deaths of
soldiers at Iwo Jima. For one thing, as already mentioned, most victims of 9/11 were not
willing  sacrifices  in  any  possible  sense  of  those  words.  Secondly,  even  the  media
sanctification of the firefighters in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, which worked
initially to position them like soldiers and therefore like national heroes in their sacrifice,
eventually wore off as revelations of the sometimes less than heroic side of firefighters
appeared in 2002. For example, William Langewiesche’s American Ground: Unbuilding the
World Trade Center (2002) took away some of their saintly luster with his description of
firefighters  treating  their  own  dead  with  “elaborate  flag-draped  ceremonials”  while
adopting a callous “bag ‘em and tag ‘em” attitude toward civilian dead.27 As a result,
tensions  arose  in  the  weeks  after  the  attacks  between  firefighters  and  the  civilian
construction workers, who felt that the civilian dead were being forgotten in the media
hype about firefighters.
35 Perhaps the biggest reason for the lack of enduring solidarity as an effect of the Sept.
11 attacks is the way the emotions of that day were channeled by the Bush administration
into a strategy of revenge that targeted what turned out to be an unrelated country and
to have had very ambiguous results. Iraq is no longer ruled by a unstable dictator, but the
war  has  brought  no  tangible  benefits  to  the  United  States  (though  many  private
corporations have profited greatly), and certainly no sense of national regeneration or
rededication to a common cause. On the contrary, the war in Iraq has left America heavily
in debt and more polarized than ever.
36 Precisely because most wars America has waged have failed so utterly at producing
any kind of national solidarity, something that needs to be examined in this discussion of
ritual conditions and ritual agency is the question of what level this logic operates on.
Clearly, it is not the level of individual actors, since no American official would ever think
War and National Renewal: Civil Religion and Blood Sacrifice in American Culture
European journal of American studies, Vol 7, No 2 | 2012
12
of himself as sending American soldiers to die in order to strengthen national cohesion.28
Even less is this the logic of official state discourse or reasoning. In fact, the ignorance of
individuals  and  states  of  the  advantages  of  war  sacrifice  as  ritualized  social  glue  is
obvious from how often wars are conducted ineptly, from a ritual point of view, robbing
them of any efficacy whatsoever. In any case, as Girard insists, and Marvin and Ingle
concur,  the  real  motives  for  the  group-member  sacrifice  must  be  unknown  to  the
participants of the ritual.29 A war must seem to be provoked by an external enemy and
not sought out by the group. The sacrifice will not work to generate group feeling and
solidarity if there is any hint of recognition that the group desired the sacrifice in any
way.  This  split  between  the  explicitly  articulated  and  the  tacit  ritual  meaning  of
sacrificial  violence  is  the  reason  why  analysis  of  political  speeches,  documents,  and
memos may not explain everything about a nation’s behavior. By definition, the collective
will and agency operates on a level that is not conscious or epistemologically available to
individuals. It is a level that is necessarily supra-individual even though individuals will
have their own sense of why they are doing something like enlisting in the military or
visiting a national memorial. At the same time, the collective meaning, agency and effects
of such actions and institutions will exist on a different plane of social reality than the
meaning and effects of individuals’ actions and how they perceive them.30 
37 It is often said that wars are launched as a means of generating unity and distracting a
civilian population from domestic discord.  This is  the cynical  commonplace that was
made about Clinton’s bombing of Serbia and Kosovo as well  as Bush Sr.’s decision to
attack Iraq in 1990. Like many clichés, it may be partly true, and some wars do indeed
create powerful feelings of national solidarity, spawning institutions and commemoration
practices that give the country momentum for a while. Yet Marvin and Ingle’s theory of
blood sacrifice and civil religion suggests that this solidarity comes not from facing or
defeating a common enemy, real or invented, but from the deaths of members/soldiers
willing to die in the name of the nation. In other words, the only kind of war that could
possibly create real national renewal is one that is so cataclysmic that it would cost not
thousands, but hundreds of thousands, of lives. If Americans realized that they cannot get
national  unity  with  military  action  on  the  cheap,  perhaps  we  might  rethink  our
willingness,  generation  after  generation,  to  believe  that  war  can  offer  any  kind  of
desirable solution to international conflict. As H.W. Brands reminds us, “during the past
two hundred years no country has sent military forces into battle more often than the
United States.”31 If  we understood better the mixed motivations that  drive American
politicians to choose war as a foreign policy option, we might have a better chance at
making other choices. If we also understood better the powerful mechanisms at work in
collective and national identifications, we might become more adept at creating group
solidarity by means of elections and other popular democratic processes instead of so
often looking for a quick fix of regeneration through violence.
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11.  New York Times, March 19, 1995: 41.
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homo duplex. With this notion Durkheim sought to account for how, “in so far as he belongs to
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“transcendent” level of thought and action is the level on which the social logic of group feeling
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ABSTRACTS
Wars are often associated with a rhetoric of renewal or new beginnings. This essay explores this
claim through the lens of civil religion and a recent book by Carolyn Marvin and David Ingle,
Blood Sacrifice and the Nation, which combines Emile Durkheim with Réné Girard in proposing that
modern national cohesion depends on blood sacrifice. I unpack some of the paradoxes raised by
this theory of national renewal in the context of 9/11, with a special focus on the sacred status of
the flag and the special attention given to uniformed serviceman in the American body politic
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